Climate Policy to Defeat the Green Paradox by Fölster, Stefan & Nyström, Johan
Climate Policy to Defeat the Green Paradox
Stefan Fo ¨lster, Johan Nystro ¨m
Published online: 8 June 2010
Abstract Carbon dioxide emissions have accelerated
since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. This discouraging
development may partly be blamed on accelerating world
growth and on lags in policy instruments. However, it also
raises serious question concerning whether policies to
reduce CO2 emissions are as effective as generally
assumed. In recent years, a considerable number of studies
have identiﬁed various feedback mechanisms of climate
policies that often erode, and occasionally reinforce, their
effectiveness. These studies generally focus on a few
feedback mechanisms at a time, without capturing the
entire effect. Partial accounting of policy feedbacks is
common in many climate scenarios. The IPCC, for exam-
ple, only accounts for direct leakage and rebound effects.
This article attempts to map the aggregate effects of dif-
ferent types of climate policy feedback mechanisms in a
cohesive framework. Controlling feedback effects is
essential if the policy measures are to make any difference
on a global level. A general conclusion is that aggregate
policy feedback mechanisms tend to make current climate
policies much less effective than is generally assumed. In
fact, various policy measures involve a deﬁnite risk of
‘backﬁring’ and actually increasing CO2 emissions. This
risk is particularly pronounced once effects of climate
policies on the pace of innovation in climate technology
are considered. To stand any chance of controlling carbon
emissions, it is imperative that feedback mechanisms are
integrated into emission scenarios, targets for emission
reduction and implementation of climate policy. In many
cases, this will reduce the scope for subsidies to renewable
energy sources, but increase the scope for other measures
such as schemes to return carbon dioxide to the ground and
to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases from wetlands
and oceans. A framework that incorporates policy feedback
effects necessitates rethinking the design of the national
and regional emission targets. This leads us to a new way
of formulating emission targets that include feedback
effects, the global impact target. Once the full climate
policy feedback mechanisms are accounted for, there are
probably only three main routes in climate policy that stand
a chance of mitigating global warming: (a) returning car-
bon to the ground, (b) technological leaps in zero-emission
energy technology that make it proﬁtable to leave much
carbon in the ground even in Annex II countries and (c)
international agreements that make it more proﬁtable to
leave carbon in the ground or in forests.
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THE CLIMATE POLICY ILLUSION
SincethesigningoftheKyotoProtocol,CO2emissionshave
accelerated from 1.3% per year in the 1990s to a staggering
3.3% per year from 2000 to 2006. This trajectory has pro-
pelledtheatmosphereintosomeoftheworsescenariosinthe
IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report scenarios. An optimistic
view is that emissions temporarily accelerated due to the
surge inworld economicgrowthinthe years2003–2007and
lags in policy implementation. In 2009, for example, emis-
sions will probably temporarily fall in the economic down-
turn. A more pessimistic view is instead that post-Kyoto
emissions would have accelerated even more if it had not
been for a one-time shift in the industrial structure of many
former communist countries. Lower emissions in many
eastern European countries are the main reason why Europe
stands a chance of reaching its Kyoto targets (Fig. 1).
The UNFCCC negotiations are grounded on the
assumptions that: (a) it is possible to stay within the 2C
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the 2C target is sufﬁcient to avoid ‘dangerous climate
change’; (c) we are not yet in a danger zone today, in terms
of GHG concentration levels; (d) current climate policies
are by and large effective and simply need to be scaled up.
Worryingly, many of these assumptions may be too
optimistic. This article takes issue with the fourth
assumptions. Negotiations as well as most countries’ cli-
mate policy design may start from an outdated or mis-
leading view of the effectiveness of many measures to
reduce emissions. This would greatly hinder, or at least
delay, the world’s chances of mitigating global warming.
One reason for the neglect of climate policy failure is
that many studies of so-called carbon leakage and rebound
focus on partial and short-term effects, and thus convey a
misleadingly sanguine impression.
For example, extraction and burning of harvest residue
from forests is often assumed to be renewable and, there-
fore, free of CO2 emissions when climate policies are
designed. This assumption ignores that extraction and
transporting gives rise to emissions, and that burning the
residue releases carbon dioxide 10–30 years earlier than
otherwise would be the case. If the substituted fossil fuel
then is available on the world market and used elsewhere,
the net effect of residue burning may actually be an
increase in CO2 emissions.
The following article is an attempt to conceptualise the
aggregate of various feedback effects into one coherent
model.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY
FEEDBACKS
Many climate policy reports, such as the Stern review
(2006), attempt to estimate the theoretical cost of reducing
emissions assuming that climate policy is efﬁcient and that
all countries, ﬁrms and consumers act rationally. If similar
reasoning were applied to other human calamities such as
crime, warfare or malnutrition, the conclusion would
almost certainly be that the theoretical cost of reducing
these is close to zero or negative. Yet they persist. Clearly,
the relevant question must instead be which policy instru-
ments are available and how effective they really are, once
side effects and feedbacks are accounted for.
A policy measure intended to reduce carbon emissions
generally consists of a tax, a subsidy or some regulation. It
is not always obvious which is which. For example, a
reduced vehicle tax for low-emission cars can be described
as a subsidy or as an extra tax on high-emission cars.
Similarly, a cap-and-trade system can be described as a
regulation, but if emission rights are auctioned off it is
much the same as a tax.
1
There are other policy measures that we do not explic-
itly address in this article. Among them are various ways of
creating awareness, and direct government investments or
purchases. Even these can give rise to similar feedback
mechanisms as are illustrated in this article.
Taxes, subsidies and regulation can be described as
having two principal effects. They can (a) reduce the level
of carbon emitting activities and/or (b) increase carbon
efﬁciency so that emissions are reduced for a given level of
activity. In practice, ﬁrms that meet a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade system can react by (a) cutting down production
or/and (b) investing in more emission efﬁcient production.
The same reasoning holds for the consumers. A gasoline
tax could (a) reduce trafﬁc and communication and/or (b)
make people invest in more carbon efﬁcient ways of
transport such as hybrid cars or public transport.
Correcting the market failure of carbon emissions can be
motivatedintermsofsocialcostsandbeneﬁts.Inordertodo
this correctly, the feedback effects that the policies or cor-
rection mechanisms give rise to have to be accounted for.
These are often described in terms of leakage and rebound.
Unfortunately, there are no commonly agreed deﬁnitions of
theseterms.Empiricalstudiesonleakage,forexample,often
includesomereboundeffectsandviceversa.Forthepurpose
of this article, policy feedback mechanisms will be grouped
in four categories as shown in Fig. 2: Leakage, local
rebound, global rebound and innovation feedbacks.
Feedback effects include carbon leakage, the rise of
emissions in Annex II countries due to the regulated
activity in countries that reduce emissions; rebound effects,
a lower price of carbon emitting products will give rise to
an increased demand that reduces the initial effect; inno-
vation feedbacks, a higher price on carbon has positive,
dynamic effects on innovation and negative effects on
carbon prices.
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Fig. 1 World carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels before and
after the Kyoto protocol was signed
1 A real difference in efﬁciency between the cap-and-trade and a tax
system arise when uncertainty is introduced, depending on elastic-
ities. See Weitzman (1974).
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tially intended emission reduction will be lost because of
more production outside the area (leakage) or through the
increased demand (rebound effect) also taken into account
the innovation effect. If the feedback effect is over 100%,
then the entire initial reduction is lost and global emissions
will actually rise or backﬁre.
The following section reviews the channels through
which the feedback effects work and examples of how the
framework can be used.
Carbon Leakage
Leakage has often been analysed narrowly as the short-run
effects on sales and production patterns as a result of higher
CO2 emission costs. Table 1 shows different estimates of
cost increases in some industries that are affected by the
European emission trading system (ETS).
Based on these estimated cost increases, various models
are used to calculate the extent of leakage. OECD (2008)
estimates that a cost increase of 1% in the industries above
leads to reduced production in Europe of 3–4%. This would
give rise to leakage of 12.6 by the year 2020 (and 19.9% by
2050 with a 50% emission reduction), but considerably
lower if other countries such as China and Brazil join the
abatement countries.
2
This estimate and others like it are based on large-scale
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analyses. Based
on these, the IPCC (2007) assumes modest leakage rates
for the Kyoto Protocol.
Nevertheless, these estimates are based on short-term
effects. In the long run, it is conceivable that entire carbon
intensive production facilities close down in Europe and
are replaced by purchases from other countries. In that
case, leakage would be considerably larger. From Sweden,
for example, paper and pulp facilities shut down at a rate of
2–3% a year, largely replaced by start ups outside Europe.
In addition, there may be considerable leakage from
industries that are not heavy CO2 emitters but comprise a
muchlargershareofthetotal.Forexample,vacationsabroad
are a rapidly expanding way of moving consumption to
Annex II countries. An indication of this is given by esti-
mates of the emissions that Europeans give rise to both at
home and abroad. Studies put the emissions from Sweden at
about6tonsperinhabitantandyear.However,theemissions
a Swede gives rise to including via imports and excluding
emissions in the production of exports are put at 6.3–12 tons
depending on assumptions used. The most ambitious cal-
culations land in the upper range.
3 These ﬁgures are not
necessarily a fair representation of Swedes’ global impact
since they ignore emission savings of Swedish ﬁrms and
technology abroad. However, they are an indication that
leakagecanbemuchlargerthanestimatedbymodelsthatonly
take account of some of the high energy-using industries.
Rebound Effects
The rebound effect can be divided into local and global
effects. This distinction is fruitful since most empirical
papers on the subject only consider local rebound.
An example of local rebound is energy savings that
lower the price of energy, allowing consumers to spend
more on other goods and also lowering the relative price of
energy ending up spending more on both.
4 Global rebound
effects, or macroeconomic effects, prevail when energy
savings in, e.g. Europe entails lower energy prices and thus
increase demand elsewhere in the world.
Sorrell et al. (2009) provide an overview of the prob-
lems in capturing the rebound effect, but stresses the fact
that the effect must be taken into consideration and criticise
Stern (2006) for neglecting these effects.
Local Rebound
Literature reviews of local rebound effects can be found in
Greening et al. (2000), Binswanger (2001) and Dimitrop-
olous (2007). Many of the studies identify a part of the
local rebound effect. For example, studies attempting to
estimate ﬁrst-order effects in the transport sector ﬁnd
rebound effects ranging from 5 to 51%.
5 Similarly, studies
       Net CO2 reduction
Leakage
Local rebound 
Global rebound 
Innovation
Tax, subsidy, 
regulation
Reduced activity 
Greater
carbon
efficiency
Fig. 2 Feedback effects of taxes, subsidies or regulation to reduce
carbon emissions
2 The EU produces similar estimates, see EC (2008a, b). See also
Paltsev (2001), Babiker (2005), Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) and
Marschinski et al. (2008).
3 Carlsson-Kanyama et al. (2007).
4 This mechanism can be seen in analogy with textbook economics of
the substation and income effects of a price change.
5 Examples of such studies are Blair et al. (1984), Leung and
Vesenka (1987), Mayo and Mathis (1988), Weinblatt (1989), Gately
(1990), Greene (1992), Walker and Wirl (1993), Haughton and Sarker
(1996).
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produce a range of estimates between 5 and 65%.
6
The higher ﬁgures typically arise in studies that estimate
both long-run and short-run effects. A typical example of
these studies is an analysis of the fuel economy rebound
effect for US household vehicles using data on US
households’ consumption of car transport.
7 The conclusion
is that the long-run ﬁrst-order effects amount to 20% of the
initial fuel saving.
Estimates of ﬁrst-order effects in industry range from 0
to over 100%.
8 In addition to the ﬁrst-order effects, the
second order and economy-wide effects have to be con-
sidered. A number of studies ﬁnd that these effects roughly
double the ﬁrst-order effects. For example, a study of a
number of British energy conserving policies found the
economy-wide rebound to be 11%, on top of ﬁrst-order
rebound effects of 15%. However, another study of the
same policies put the total of ﬁrst-order and economy-wide
effects at 40%.
9 Roy (2000) ﬁnds a rebound effect of more
than 50% due to the income effect of greater energy efﬁ-
ciency in Indian households. Frondel et al. (2007) ﬁnd
rebound effects between 57 and 67% analysing fuel efﬁ-
ciency improvements in a panel of German households.
In many cases, the studies cited focus on more easily
quantiﬁable aspects and ignore those that are more difﬁcult
to measure or simulate. That this can make a big difference
is illustrated by Bra ¨nnlund et al. (2007) who simulate
ﬁrst- and second-order rebound effects when interactions
between the Swedish transport and heating sector are taken
account of. The result was that initial energy saving of 20%
eventually led to increased carbon emissions of 5%. This is
a rebound effect of over 100%, which often is termed
‘backﬁre’.
10 In CGE models that are designed to capture
the economy-wide rebound effects backﬁre is frequently
found, e.g. Glomsrod and Taojuan (2005) for the case
of energy efﬁciency improvements in China or Hanley
et al. (2008) for energy efﬁciency improvements in
Scotland.
Studies that have come close to capture the rebound
effect over time include Schurr (1985) and Fouquet and
Pearson (2006), which provides long time series of energy
usage and conclude that there are backﬁring effects.
The risk of backﬁre is particularly prevalent in the light
of European carbon dioxide emission limits. For example,
subsidies to railroads expansion are often motivated by
climate considerations.
11 The key question, however, is
how additional railroad trafﬁc affects global carbon dioxide
emissions. Since Europe has agreed upon overall limit for
carbon emissions, the main effect of additional railroads is
merely to move emissions from the non-tradable (trans-
port) sector to the tradable (coal-ﬁred electricity genera-
tion) sector.
Even if Sweden tightened its national targets in con-
nection with railroad investments, the net effects’ risk
Table 1 Increased production costs in European high leakage industries as a result of 20 €/ton CO2 emission cost
Study Iron and steel,
primary (%)
Iron and steel,
secondary (%)
Paper and
pulp (%)
Cement (%) Country Model
Ho et al. (2008) 4.6 1.4–2.0 2.6–3.2 10.0 USA Partial equilibrium, ﬁxed proportions
of inputs, import substitution,
constant technology
IEA (2005)
a 15.4 3.0 7.2 37.2 EU Sectorstudy, constant technology,
10% free emission rights
Smale et al. (2006)
a 11.3 – 24.0 96.0 UK/EU Cournotcompetition, abatement curves
from DERFA, free emission rights
McKinsey (2006) 17.3 2.9 1.0–7.5 36.5 EU Sectorstudy
CE Delft (2008)
a 5.8 3.1 0.6–0.8 0–4.3 NL Sectorstudy, no indirect costs
Climate Strategies (2007) 27.0 2.0 9.0 34.0 UK/EU Sectorstudy, some technological change
a Prices expressed as marginal costs
Note: The cost increases are short term increases of production costs at a constant cost of 20 €/ton CO2-emission
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2009)
6 Examples of studies are Khazzoom (1986), Dubin et al. (1986),
Dinan (1987), Hirst (1987).
7 Greene et al. (1999).
8 Examples are Bentzen (2004), Greening et al. (2000), Laitner
(2000), Saunders (2008).
9 Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009).
10 See also Mizobuchi (2008) who argues that the rebound effect can
be smaller if capital costs are large since the income effect is reduced.
11 In Sweden, railroads used 1.4% of Sweden’s electricity consump-
tion in 2006, but 34% of Sweden’s import of electricity which mostly
came from Danish coal ﬁred plants (SIKA 2007; Svensk Energi
2008).
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The Swedish investment would raise electricity prices and
prices for emissions rights and thus discourage similar
investments in other countries. Thus, subsidies to railroads
in European countries may have negligible net effects on
carbon dioxide emissions and may in fact backﬁre once the
global rebound effects, discussed below, are taken into
consideration.
Global Rebound
Local rebound has received much attention, partly because
climate policies are often designed with an eye to national
emission reduction targets. In order to prevent global
warming, the effects on global emissions are the only rel-
evant measure. Global rebound arises when energy savings
in some countries reduce energy prices on the world market
and in Annex II countries, leading to an increased global
demand.
12
In a recent study, Terry Barker, of the Cambridge Centre
for Climate Change Mitigation Research, examines the
world-wide rebound effects of the International Energy
Agency’s (IEA) recommendations for efﬁciency measures.
He concludes that if they are followed in the next few
decades, the total rebound effect—the proportion of
potential energy savings offset by changes in consumer and
industry behaviour—could be 31% by 2020 and about 52%
around the world by 2030.
13
Initial simulations of short-term global rebound effects
put these at smaller values largely because coal supply is
assumed to be rather elastic in the short run. Thus, climate
policy measures that reduce demand in the short run would
seem to imply a signiﬁcant reduction in carbon extraction.
These short-run effects are sometimes included in esti-
mates of leakage discussed above.
In the longer run, however, demand rises toward a zone
where supply is much more inelastic because carbons are at
the margin extracted in places where extraction is
increasingly expensive. This means that the short-run
effects of climate policy may have little effect on the long-
run emissions of carbon dioxide.
Figure 3 illustrates this. The supply curve depicts the
costs of extracting carbon over the entire range of
remaining fossil carbon reserves. The demand curves refer
to aggregate demand (not annual) over the short and long
term.
In recent years, research literature has evolved that
explicitly takes account of how energy savings in some
countries interact with the supply strategies of countries
that extract fossil energy.
14 A disturbing conclusion is that
energy savings in some countries have a small, or even
reverse, effect on carbon supply even in the short term.
The issue can easily be understood in terms of the ﬁgure
above. Higher long-run demand leads carbon extracting
countries to expect higher future prices. It is then better to
leave more oil and coal in the ground and slow the rate of
extraction. If the effect of greener policies is to lower long-
run demand, then it may be better to increase the rate of
extraction.
In Fig. 4, the dotted lines show what short-term price
carbon suppliers will demand given a discount rate and an
expectation of long run price. Figure 4 illustrates that if
long run expected demand falls, the short-run supply of
carbon can very well increase.
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Fig. 4 How lower long run demand of carbon can increase short run
supply
12 Wei (2009) analyses a general equilibrium model of global
rebound effects.
13 Barker et al. (2009).
14 Sinn (2007, 2008). An early study that pointed to this effect was
Felder and Rutherford (1993). Additional studies in this direction are
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Rubio and Esriche (2001).
15 While some oil producers may not be as far sighted as this
reasoning implies, others, such as Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and Mexico
clearly pump much less oil in the short run than they could, and
explicitly refer to long run price expectations.
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how this interaction leads to considerably higher global
rebound effects under a wide range of reasonable
assumptions and in some circumstances even can exceed
100%.
One might think that if most countries eventually sign
future abatement agreements, then global consumption of
fossil energy should fall signiﬁcantly. This is, however, not
necessarily the case. Some 30% of all countries have fossil
energy and may be reluctant to leave it in the ground.
Sweden exploits its peat and Canada its oil sands. What,
then, are the chances that Iran, Venezuela and Turkmen-
istan are going to curtail oil production? Many of the
poorer oil-producing countries also have rapidly rising
living standards will eventually be able to use all the oil
that richer countries from. This point was starkly apparent
in the years 2004–2007 when increased oil consumption in
the Middle Eastern countries equalled about half of the
global increase in oil production.
Innovation Feedbacks
Climate policies stimulate technological improvements of
energy efﬁciency or non-fossil energy production. These in
turn can give rise to both negative and positive feedback
mechanisms. The main negative feedback is a straightfor-
ward extension of the global rebound effect discussed
above.
Figure 5 depicts a ‘green technology supply curve’. The
higher the price of carbon fuels, the more proﬁtable green
technology is and the more will be supplied (here measured
intermsofcarbonfuelsthatarenotextractedinthelongrun).
Figure 5alsodepictsafossilfueldemandcurveshowingthat
the more green technology promises to replace carbon fuels,
the more carbon prices fall, which erases some of the stim-
ulus provided by climate policies. Thus, the net effect of
green technology on carbon supply follows the short red
arrow, rather than the long green arrow.
For example, Popp (2006) illustrates this negative
feedback mechanism in a macroeconomic model, also
capturing R&D subsidies pooling researchers into one type
of technology at the expense of others. He concludes that
subsidies to green technology will not reduced carbon
emissions that much unless they are complemented by a
carbon tax to counteract the effect of falling oil prices.
Since a carbon tax will not be applied in Annex II
countries, the adaption of green technology in these
countries is not straightforward. The technological advan-
ces must be so dramatic that they allow Annex II countries
to produce zero-emission energy at a cost lower than the
marginal cost of extracting fossil fuels.
The possible positive feedback of climate policies in a
dynamic setting are that they can stimulate further tech-
nological innovation leading to lower emissions later on.
The concept of positive external effects of technological
development on future technological advance is well
established and part of the motivation for tax-ﬁnanced
R&D.
A stronger version of the positive technological feed-
back thesis is that they not only make a big difference in
reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but actually stimulate
economic growth. This so-called Porter hypothesis builds
much on the idea of a ﬁrst-mover advantage, which per
deﬁnition cannot exist for the world as a whole. Even for
individual countries, there is little empirical support for the
Porter hypothesis.
16
Within the EU green technology is primarily supported
through ETAP (Environmental Technologies Action Plan).
ETAP is a way to assemble the member states’ different
efforts to ﬁnd synergy effects within Europe. The action
plan is not binding but it implicitly puts pressure on the
member states to take action, and all countries are required
to report national action plans in promoting green tech-
nology. For instance, the Swedish action plan concludes
that Sweden need ‘to develop special tailor-made and
system oriented action packages in order to raise the
market share of environmental technology’.
17 The Danish
action plan is even more speciﬁc and concludes that wind
power, biomass, aquatic environment and energy efﬁciency
are the prospering markets in Denmark.
18 In the latest
ETAP review from the EU commission, it was concluded
that further stimuli are needed to promote the diffusion of
green technology.
19 Instruments like standards, deﬁnitions
of focus areas and subsides are advocated. The fact that the
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16 Bra ¨nnlund (2007).
17 Swentech (2007, p. 70).
18 Danish Environmental Protection Agency (2007).
19 EC (2007).
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member states are required to report their efforts induces
politicians to act.
20
Many of these targeted initiatives create some negative
feedbacks apart from the positive, intended effect. A
recent example is the EU-regulation on car emissions
which is set 130 g CO2 per km for new cars. Regulations
always run the risk of excluding new techniques from the
market, since they often are forced to be expressed in
technical or unclear terms. An example of this is how the
regulation will handle undergoing research at Georgia
Institute of Technology, where the car emissions are
collected directly from the exhaust pipe. The collected
emissions are later disposed at the service station and
transformed into fuel.
21 The EU-regulation does not
deﬁne whether such techniques are in compliance. Such
uncertainties discourage at least some innovations. Reg-
ulations should therefore aim to be technologically neutral
but this is always complicated.
This is just one example of when political interventions
in the market create uncertainty. Targeted sectors, stan-
dards and subsidies are often not stable and therefore not
credible. Experience with attempts to ‘pick winners’
among future technologies has, in general, not been
encouraging. This appears to be true also for green tech-
nology. Evidence presented in Fig. 6 does not obviously
support the strategy taken by the EU. Data for EU-27
indicate that targeted subsides do not entail large exports of
green technology.
According to some rankings, the US has the most
developed green tech market.
22 A large amount of private
capital invested is a boon to commercialising green prod-
ucts.
23 Commercialisation is often identiﬁed as the main
bottleneck for European green tech growth (Fig. 7).
One problem appears to be that selective measures to
stimulate green technology often lack predictability and
continuity which unnecessarily raise risks for private
investors.
24
The abundance of policy instruments such as different
kinds of targeted taxes, subsidies and standards both
nationally and on the EU level create uncertainty and
reduce the supply of private capital. This notion runs the
risk of creating a downward spiral, where a more activist
targeted policy ends up with less private investments in
green tech.
How Feedback Effects Add Up
The following section illustrates more speciﬁcally how the
policy feedback framework can be used. The main con-
clusion from the empirical work on estimating the feedback
effect is that it is very hard to capture the entire effect.
There are many variables that are interdependent, which
are hard to separate and control for. Sorrell et al. (2009)
provides an overview of the problems in capturing the
rebound effect, but stresses the fact that these effects must
be taken into consideration and criticise Stern (2006) for
neglecting these effects.
A Unilateral European Emission Target
The EU has set up a very ambitious target to reduce
emission with 20% by the year 2020. However, in
designing this target, not much attention has been paid to
the feedback mechanisms that will contradict the ambition
of reducing emissions on a global level.
Carbon Leakage Policy instruments as the EU-ETS and
national carbon taxes have negative side effects on the
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20 EC (2001).
21 Damm and Fedorov (2008).
22 ITPS (2008).
23 Lindstro ¨m and Olofsson (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2001),
Hellman and Puri (2002) and Bottazzi et al. (2004).
24 Dealﬂower (2003) and Nutek (2007).
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European companies will meet higher energy prices and
costs for carbon emissions that their competitors outside
Europe will not face. European industries facing global
competition will sometimes be forced to reallocate pro-
duction outside Europe. Both these mechanisms entail an
acceleration of carbon emissions in the non-regulated
regions outside Europe.
Local Feedback An important component in meeting the
European target for a 20% reduction of emissions until
2020 is energy efﬁciency. This is a relatively cheap way of
reducing direct emissions, but not necessarily global
emissions. The EU has an independent target of improving
energy efﬁciency by 20% within EU. The target entails
policy instruments speciﬁcally directed for energy efﬁ-
ciency, which regularly clash with policies for reducing
CO2 emissions and the renewables target.
25 Since the
problem concerns emissions of carbon, political interfer-
ence in the means to an end often creates more problems
than solutions.
Assuming that the energy efﬁciency target will be met,
energy prices in Europe will be held down. This will lead
to a substitution and income effect. The reduction in price
will also give the consumer more money to spend on other
things, perhaps imported products from non-regulated
countries with production that increases global emissions.
Both these effects make up the local rebound effect. These
effects most deﬁnitely exist but the empirical studies of the
local rebound effects have a very large spread and are
rarely capture aggregates.
Global Feedback Europe is an important actor on the
world market. European demand is not an insigniﬁcant part
of the aggregated world demand and actions are taken to
reduce demand for fossil fuel. Lower European demand for
oil has a negative effect on the world price of oil, making it
cheaper for other countries to consume. If Europe is
credible in this strategy, the oil-producing countries will,
according to Sinn’s Green Paradox, be provided with an
incentive to pump up the oil faster as the future price will
go down due to a lack of demand.
26
Empirical data from the US and different European
countries show a rebound effect in the transport sector
around 30%.
27 The studies, however, do not capture Sinn’s
Green Paradox since they do not take account of how a
regional reduction in demand also has an effect on the
global price, i.e. supply and demand outside the regulated
region. If this is included Sinn argues that the European
efforts can backﬁre, i.e. the rebound effect will exceed
100%. In the example below, we assume that the global
rebound effect.
Innovation The hardest feedback mechanism to quantify
is the innovation effect, partly because of the long time lags
involved in developing technology caused by a higher price
of carbon. Evidence for the causality between a high price
of carbon and the development of green technology is
pretty weak or can be explained by a very long time lag.
The EU, and Sweden in particular, has, for a long time,
been very adamant in regulating emissions with taxes and
later the cap-and-trade system, EU-ETS. Despite this, the
US is by far the most successful actor on greentech market
without much carbon regulations.
Summing Up the Effects There is a complex relationship
between the feedback mechanisms. In Fig. 8, we illustrate
how they can be might be aggregated in a stylised manner,
for the case of unilateral European target.
In order to capture the whole feedback, the four types
of feedbacks can be considered cumulatively, assuming
that global rebound applies to emission reductions that
are not lost due to leakage and local rebound. In this
simpliﬁed example 59–100% of the initial 20% reduction
within Europe will be lost due to feedback effects. The
total feedback effect for the unilateral European emission
target may thus be much smaller than commonly
assumed.
Political Focus on Biofuel
Like all theory, the feedback model gets more accurate with
more detailed examples. In combination with reducing oil
consumption in Europe, a lot of focus has been put on pro-
moting biofuels, especially in Sweden.
28 The crucial point
thereisthattheproductionofbiofuelsorbiomassitselfgives
rise to carbon dioxide emissions. In many studies, these
emissionshavebeenquantiﬁedatamagnitudeof30–70%of
corresponding amount of fossil fuel. A number of recent
studies, however, arrive at much higher estimates. For
example, a recent report from the International Council for
Science (ICSU) concludes that the production of biofuels
actually releases more greenhouse gases than a corre-
spondingamountoffossilfuel.Thereasonisthatproduction
25 A general equilibrium model of the Nordic energy market shows
that there the energy efﬁciency target is in conﬂict with introducing
many of the renewable energy sources on the Nordic market (Profu
2008).
26 Sinn (2008).
27 See, e.g. Anson and Turner (2009) and Binswanger (2001).
28 Ka ˚gesson (2009).
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much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.
29
Therefore, it might be more reasonable to put the local
rebound effect from bioenergy in the range 30–100% of a
corresponding amount of fossil fuel.
The problem is that the saved fossil fuel is not left in the
ground just because extra biofuel is produced. If the saved
fossil fuel is subject to the global rebound of 50–100%, then
the net greenhouse gas emissions somewhere in the range of
a decrease of 41% and an increase of 100% (Fig. 9).
30
The large spread of the result captures the fact that
bioenergy sources differ in efﬁciency. There is, e.g. a big
difference in promoting ethanol in comparison of using
leftovers from sawmills for wood pellets regarding the
feedback effects.
Apart from not recognising the feedback effects in the
renewable target, other claims are often connected to this
target. EmployRes (2009) also makes the claim, based on
elaborate macroeconomic modelling, that the policies pro-
moting renewable energy systems create more jobs. This
claim is, however, based on three rather dubious assump-
tions.OneisthatEuropeoverthecomingdecadesisgoingto
be in a state of unemployment due to insufﬁcient demand
that can be alleviated by the investment impetus that
renewables provide. The other is that labour intensive bio-
mass really is a part of the policy mix, even though it may
actually backﬁre in terms of CO2 emissions, and the third is
that only jobs count. After all consumers have to pay more
for energy and lose real purchasing power.
CLIMATE POLICIES THAT DEFEAT FEEDBACKS
Having gone through the feedback mechanisms, the
remaining question is how they can be kept to a mini-
mum under the current climate policy agenda. Climate
policies generally focus on national mitigation strategies.
Discussion within the EU concentrates on burden sharing
between countries and national strategies to cut national
emission, without much attention paid to the feedback
effects. The framework for taking account of policy
feedbacks presented here illustrates how global emission
reductions are likely to be much smaller than what could
be expected from summing the climate strategies of
abatement countries.
There is, therefore, a strong case to be made that current
climate policies focusing on national targets are not up to
the task of reducing global emissions. Therefore, a new
way of setting up national climate polices that recognises
policy feedback effects is needed.
Global Impact Targets for Climate Policy
An important step towards recognising leakage and
rebound effects would be to include them in the national
climate targets. What is needed is a target that includes all
emission reductions and feedback effects due to a nation’s
climate policy. Within today’s organisational structure, this
would be the responsibility of the UNFCCC.
The European countries national emission targets
according to the Kyoto process can in principal be
described accordingly, with Sweden as an example.
31
 Total feedback 35 to 100% 
 Net CO2       – 41 to + 100  - 
Leakage              - 
Local rebound   30-100%
Global rebound  50-100%  
Innovation              -
Tax, subsidy, regulation 
aimed at bioenergy 
Greater
carbon
efficiency
- 70 %     
to  0% 
Fig. 9 How do feedbacks sum up? Example 2: Subsidies to
bioenergy
Total feedback          59  to 100 %
Net CO2  reduction   -8  to     0 %
Leakage       
Local rebound
Global rebound
Innovation
Carbon emission 
taxes and EU-ETS 
Greater
carbon
efficiency
- 15 % 
Reduced activity   – 5% 
+ 6-13 %
+ 11-40 %
+ 50-100%
   0 
Fig. 8 How do feedbacks sum up? Example 1: A unilateral
European emission target enforced by carbon taxes and ETS. Note:
The ﬁgures are based on the empirical studies in ‘‘A conceptual
framework for policy feedbacks’’ section
29 Maize and rapeseed are said to be particularly nitrogen-leaky, but
the upshot is that all agricultural production that uses nitrogen-rich
fertiliser release nitrous oxide (International Council for Science
2009).
30 Even harvest residue from forests probably increases carbon
dioxide emissions during the ﬁrst 20–40 years. See, e.g. Holmgren
et al. (2007).
31 This do not include sectors within the EU-ETS.
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¼ 83% of the emissions from 2005 ðÞ
þ net buy of AAUs   net savings of AAUs
  annulment of AAUs:
This measurement does not reveal the real emission
from Sweden, since feedback effects are not accounted for.
A more appropriate and useful emission target for the
Annex 1 countries would be the global impact target
Sweden’s global impact target
¼ Sweden’s emission allowance according to Kyoto
þ x% of emissions from 2005; which is caused by
Sweden outside Annex 1:
Adopting a global impact target would include both
domestic emissions and the emissions caused abroad from
imported goods and other rebound effects. Trade will
expand in a more globalised world, and the issue of
emissions from imported goods will increase over time.
The global impact target is dependent on good statistical
instruments in order for countries to accept them. The
current measurements display a large spread in the
results.
32
Consequently, an important question for the UNFCC
process in Copenhagen is to get developing countries to
start measuring and verifying their emission more rigor-
ously. It may not be reasonable to expect developing
countries to attain the same binding targets for emission
reduction as Annex 1 countries. However, the veriﬁcation
and reporting of their emission are vital to the process of
lowering the global emission and adopting a global impact
target.
Further, even local feedback mechanisms need to be
counted. Many countries simply classify harvest residue
from forests or other ‘renewables’ as zero-emission energy
sources. The European directive aiming at a target of 20
renewable energy productions by the year 2020 did not
include a correction factor for ILUC (indirect land use
change) and allows renewables that have at least 35%
lower life-cycle emissions of greenhouse gases compared
to fossil fuels.
A standard for counting everything will presumably
have considerable consequences for how local climate
policies are chosen and designed.
The global impact target would naturally also provide
decision makers with incentives to avoid measures that are
positively correlated with feedback effects. The ﬁrst aim is
of course to avoid backﬁring effects that actually increase
the net emission but also minimise measures with feedback
effects.
By and large this will probably mean that support for
various bioenergy projects will be scaled back. A number
of other directions in climate policy, outlined below, will
probably appear more productive.
Maximising Global Impact
Once the full climate policy feedback mechanisms are
accounted for, there are three main routes in climate policy
that stand a chance of mitigating global warming: (a)
returning carbon into the ground, (b) technological leaps in
zero-emission energy technology that make it proﬁtable to
leave much carbon in the ground even in Annex II coun-
tries and (c) international agreements that make it more
proﬁtable to leave carbon in the ground or in forests.
Make it More Proﬁtable to Bury It
Many new techniques are under progress for capturing and
storing carbon emission. The most developed CCS tech-
nique is the one directly connected to coal plants, but
different types of ﬁlters and vacuums under development.
In order to keep this process going, it is important to
include these techniques into the market system for carbon.
EU-ETS does include CCS techniques at the moment but
will in the future. The real difference can, however, be
made in countries like China and India. Therefore, the CCS
technique must be included in the CDM and JI mechanisms
under the UNFCCC negotiations.
In the UNFCCC negotiations, there are also talks on
technical standards to guide investments. There is of course
a need to assure the quality and safety of different tech-
niques, which are to be included in the system. However,
standards on techniques are often a risky way to go since
the ofﬁcials who set the standard are not the people on the
research frontier. Therefore, standards will seldom include
the latest technology.
Climate policy mechanisms should certainly not dis-
criminate some of the most promising ways of binding
greenhouse gases, such as different methods used in for-
estry and agriculture, such as non-plough tillage. A further
step would be to return carbon to agricultural soil. For
example, Fowles (2007) analyses consequences of
extracting black (elemental) carbon from biomass, which
can be permanently sequestered as mineral geomass and
may be relatively advantageous in terms of those risks
and uses a high-level quantitative model to compare the
approach with the alternative use of biomass to displace
fossil fuels. Black carbon has been demonstrated to pro-
duce signiﬁcant beneﬁts when sequestered in agricultural
soil, apparently without bad side-effects. Black carbon
32 Carlsson-Kanyama et al. (2007).
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energy generation, in terms of atmospheric carbon saved
per unit of biomass; an exception is where biomass can
efﬁciently displace coal-ﬁred generation. Black carbon
sequestration can reasonably be expected to be relatively
quick and cheap to apply due to its short value chain and
known technology.
Make it More Proﬁtable to Keep it in the Ground
The most attractive route to keeping more carbon in the
ground would be if leaps in alternative energy technology
made it unproﬁtable to extract many current carbon
reserves. This would be effective because it would also
affect Annex II countries. Therefore, more resources
should probably be devoted to basic energy research, which
at a world-wide level is still far below levels in the 1970s.
Another rather obvious policy measure is to keep car-
bons locked in. Many countries could probably achieve
greater global emission reduction by stopping extraction of
relatively costly fossil fuel such as oil sands or peat, than
by subsidies to various renewable projects. If climate
policies were informed by global impact targets rather than
targets for emissions from within a country’s borders, this
would become rather obvious.
The same is in principle true for deforestation. Defor-
estation accounts for around 20% of the world’s carbon
emissions. A reduction in deforestation is vital for coming
to terms with global warming. In order to provide incen-
tives for sustainable forestry in developing countries,
deforestation could be included in the market for emission
rights. There are, however, considerable practical difﬁcul-
ties in doing so (see, e.g. Angelsen 2008). Also, measures
to contain deforestation are themselves subject to rebound
effects since they increase pressure to harvest forest else-
where in the world. Even in respect to preventing defor-
estation, a move towards global impact targets would be a
better guide to climate policy. A practical intermediate step
may be to follow the route initiated by Norway which has
offered $1 billion by 2015 which will be paid only to the
extent that Brazil is able to demonstrate a reduction in
deforestation. For this purpose, Norway will develop its
own system for tracking deforestation in addition to Bra-
zil’s annual statistics.
International Agreements
The only way to fully avoid feedback effects is for all
countries to accept binding targets for their emission.
However, it is not plausible to expect the developing world
to take on the same burden as the developed countries. This
means that the problem of feedback effects will not
disappear. However, in order to cut down global emissions,
the process of developing a new climate agreement must
focus on minimising feedback effects. The current Kyoto
protocol did not pay much attention to feedback effects,
which is probably the main reason why emissions have
kept on rising.
The most important feature in designing the coming
climate agreement in Copenhagen is of course to get as
many binding targets as possible. This will give a good
starting point for dealing with the feedback effects but with
the developing world not taking on binding targets, the
problem with carbon leakage and rebound effect will not
go away. An important and effective feature in order to
minimise the problem is sectoral agreements.
Sectoral agreements are binding targets for all compa-
nies within certain sectors. This creates a level playﬁeld for
all actors competing with each other on a global market.
Apart from the EU, Australia and the US, countries like
China, India and Brazil have shown some interest for such
a solution within the UNFCCC negotiations leading up to
Copenhagen. Sectoral agreements are relevant for global
markets such as steel, cement, pulp and reﬁneries. Such an
agreement would mean that, e.g. China or India accepts
binding targets for their steel industry, which would very
much ease the problem of feedback effects within steel
production.
A successful international agreement must include ele-
ments such as sectoral agreements to minimise the feed-
back effects. Every element of such agreements that do not
consider feedback effects contradicts climate action by
creating an illusion of emission abatement.
CONCLUSION
The sum of many countries’ climate efforts risks being
much smaller than its component parts. An overriding
reason is the common neglect of feedbacks that climate
policies give rise to. This may seem odd, since the idea of
feedbacks in nature is so widely accepted.
This article maps many of the partial empirical studies
of various climate policy feedbacks and gives some
examples of how they may work at the aggregate level.
Many climate policies may have much smaller effects than
commonly assumed, and some might actually backﬁre.
There are probably only three really effective climate
policy directions that avoid substantial rebound effects: (a)
returning carbon to the ground, (b) technological leaps in
zero-emission energy technology that make it proﬁtable to
leave much carbon in the ground even in Annex II coun-
tries and (c) international agreements that make it more
proﬁtable to leave carbon in the ground or in forests.
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is imperative to recognise climate policy feedback effects
and formulate emission reduction targets that internalise
these effects.
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